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Abstract. For a decentralized and transparent society, blockchain tech-
nology has been developed. Along with this, quite a few consensus al-
gorithms that are one of core technologies in blockchain have been pro-
posed. Among them, we analyze a consensus algorithm called LFT2,
which is used by a blockchain system, ICON. We first formulate the
LFT2 consensus algorithm and then analyze safety and liveness, which
can be considered as the most important properties in distributed con-
sensus system. We prove that LFT2 satisfies safety and liveness, where a
certain assumption is required to prove liveness. In addition, we compare
LFT2 with two similar consensus algorithms, and from the comparison,
we show that a trade-off exist among the three consensus algorithms.
Finally, we simulate LFT2 to measure a liveness quality.
1 Introduction
For a decentralized and transparent society, blockchain technology has been
developed. The first blockchain system, Bitcoin [8], suggested a peer-to-peer
electronic cash system using a proof of work (PoW) consensus algorithm. In this
system, nodes in a peer-to-peer network manage a distributed ledger called a
blockchain in which transactions are stored. Each node writes latest transactions
on a new block, which may be a part of blockchain, and then they propagate
their block to other nodes. Next, each node determines whether to agree (or
vote) on the received block, and the block is connected to the existing blockchain
when enough votes are collected. After that, a new round starts, and the above
process is repeated. This process is conducted according to a consensus protocol.
Note that only transactions recorded on the blockchain are regarded as valid.
Therefore, to ensure the security, it’s important for the nodes to agree on the
same ledger. In fact, due to a block propagation delay and the existence of
attackers, nodes can have different views on blockchain. In this case, nodes should
resolve this, or the protocol should ensure that this never occurs. If not, it allows
an attacker to make an invalid transaction such as a double-spending transaction,
and this undermines the system security significantly. To resolve the above case,
each node shouldn’t vote for conflicting blocks. Here, conflicting blocks have
two types: 1) The first type is a block including conflicting transactions such
as double spending transactions or invalid transactions. 2) When two or more
different blocks are committed in the same round, these blocks belong to the
second type. The way to resolve conflicting blocks depends on each consensus
protocol.
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Safety and liveness can be considered as the most important properties of a
consensus algorithm. A consensus algorithm should satisfy safety, which means
the consensus algorithm doesn’t commit conflicting blocks. Also, a consensus
algorithm should satisfy liveness, which means the algorithm eventually extends
a blockchain by adding a block. However, by FLP impossibility [5], these cannot
be satisfied in asynchronous network situation at the same time. Thus, each
consensus algorithm has to choose which property to sacrifice. For example, the
Nakamoto consensus sacrifices the safety property (liveness over safety) while a
BFT-based consensus sacrifices the liveness property (safety over liveness).
Currently, many consensus algorithms including PoW and Byzantine Fault
Tolerance (BFT) based consensus algorithms exist. In this paper, we focus on
BFT-based consensus algorithms, and specifically, we analyze the LFT2 [6] con-
sensus algorithm. We first model the LFT2 consensus algorithm and formalize
it using a state machine. Then we prove that LFT2 satisfies safety and liveness
properties in certain assumptions. Note that according to FLP impossibility, we
cannot prove LFT2 satisfies both properties without any assumption. In ad-
dition, we define a metric called γ − function, which can represent a liveness
quality (i.e., a specific rate of creating a new block). We also compare the LFT2
consensus algorithm with two other BFT based consensus algorithms, PBFT [4]
and Hotstuff [10]. From this comparison, we find out trade-offs among these
consensus algorithms. Finally, we simulate LFT2 to measure a liveness quality
using our metric, γ − function.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
– We formalize the LFT2 consensus algorithm.
– We prove the LFT2 consensus algorithm satisfies liveness and safety under
certain assumptions.
– We simulate LFT2 to measure a liveness quality.
2 Background
2.1 Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [4] is a BFT-based consensus
algorithm. Basically, the paper [4] proposed it to prevent byzantine failures in a
replication system. To put it simply, PBFT is a practical algorithm for consensus
of a distribution system where at most f byzantine nodes out of 3f + 1 nodes
can exist in an asynchronous system. PBFT is represented in Figure 1.
Since PBFT is designed for a distributed replication system, it needs request
and reply phases. However, because both phases aren’t needed for consensus,
PBFT would have only pre-prepare, prepare, and commit phases for consensus
in a blockchain. Each round has a designated leader, and a leader proposes
a new block and sends it to all other nodes at the start of round, where the
new block would be what nodes should vote for. When the leader proposes a
new block, pre-prepare phase starts. After sending this process, prepare phase
starts. In prepare phase, all nodes receive the block and check it. If the block is
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valid, then each node has to broadcast “Prepare” message to other nodes. While
broadcasting the message, a node can receive Prepare message from other nodes.
If a node receives 2f + 1 Prepare message, the node will be in “prepared” state.
In commit phase, if a node is prepared state, each node broadcasts “Commit”
message. After broadcasting, each node will receive Commit message, and if the
number of Commit messages gotten from different nodes is greater or equal to
2f + 1, then the node accepts the block proposed by the leader. In this case, we
state that the block is committed.
Fig. 1: PBFT algorithm. This figure is from [4].
In addition, there is a view-change step in PBFT when a leader fails to
send a new block to other nodes. If view-change occurs, the next leader sends
another new block to other nodes. Because this step is a bit complicated, we
don’t describe this here. For more details, please refer the paper [4].
2.2 Hotstuff
Hotstuff is a leader-based BFT replication protocol published in 2018 by
M.Yin et al [10]. A big difference between this protocol and PBFT is leader
dependency. In PBFT, a leader is crucial only in pre-prepare phase, but in Hot-
stuff, the leader is crucial in every phase. This is because, in Hotstuff, each node
sends a message to only a leader, and the leader should propagate the message
to other nodes in every phase. This is a major difference between PBFT and
Hotstuff, and this is why we refer Hotstuff to as a leader-based BFT protocol.
Since each node doesn’t directly broadcast a vote message to other nodes, the
leader node can make some malicious actions. To prevent this, Hotstuff uses
quorum certificate (QC), which is needed for proving that the leader receives
2f + 1 correct vote messages.
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The basic algorithm of Hotstuff is represented in Figure 2. Similar to PBFT,
Hotstuff can successfully make nodes achieve consensus when at most f number
of faulty nodes exist in the system where the total number of nodes is 3f + 1. In
prepare phase, each node sends a new-view message to a leader, and the leader
receives 2f + 1 new-view messages. Then the leader sends prepare message to
all nodes in the system, and each node receives the message. In pre-commit
phase, each node checks the received prepare message, and if the message is
valid, then it sends the prepare vote message to the leader. If the leader receives
2f + 1 prepare vote messages, then the leader sends pre-commit message to
each node. In commit phase, each node validates the pre-commit message and
if the message is proper, then it sends pre-commit vote message to the leader.
If the leader receives 2f + 1 pre-commit vote messages, then the leader sends
commit message to each node. In decide phase, each node checks the commit
message gotten from the leader, and if the message is proper, then a node sends
commit vote message to the leader. Similar to the previous phases, if the leader
receives 2f + 1 commit vote messages, the leader makes a decide message and
sends to each node. In all the above steps, a leader can be a byzantine node for
some reasons. Each node can send a new-view message to the next leader when
the node judges the current leader node is byzantine. If the next leader receives
2f+1 new-view messages, then the new leader starts consensus by repeating the
above process. In fact, this new-view message process is similar to a view-change
process in PBFT.
Fig. 2: Hotstuff algorithm. This figure is from [9]
As shown in Figure 2, we can see that each round is symmetric. Thus, con-
sidering this characteristic, the Hotstuff whitepaper [10] suggests an advanced
Hotstuff called Chained Hotstuff, which has higher scalability. Chained Hotstuff
can be simply explained as a pipelining version of Hotstuff. This is described in
Figure 3. In each round, a leader node makes a message linked with the previous
block, and sends it to other nodes. Each node receives the message from the
leader and then verifies the message. The received messages include four parts,
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and each node has to check the whole four parts of the messages. In summary,
Chained Hotstuff uses pipelining in each round, and as a result, this obtains
scalability without losing the security since consensus steps aren’t reduced.
Fig. 3: Chained Hotstuff does pipelining using a symmetric structure. This figure
is from [10]
2.3 LFT2
The basic algorithm of LFT2 is similar to PBFT. A leader makes a new
block and broadcasts it to other nodes. Each node knows a leader of each round.
Thus, each node can check that the received block is proposed by a proper (or
valid) leader. If the received block doesn’t have any error, then each node makes
and broadcasts a vote message. If a node gets enough vote messages, then the
block would be a candidate block and the previous candidate block becomes a
committed block. Figure 4 represents LFT2.
To explain a specific algorithm of LFT, assumptions and rules of LFT2 are
required. In a LFT2 consensus algorithm, there are two types of nodes, honest
nodes and byzantine nodes. These nodes do following actions.
– General node
• If a node receives a message, it sends the message to neighbor nodes at
a specific time (gossip communication).
• A leader selection algorithm exists and each node knows the order.
• Each node has a local timer.
• Each node already knows a cipher suite, and every message includes
digital signature.
– Byzantine node
• A byzantine node can delay or may not send a message.
• A byzantine node can send different messages to different nodes.
• A byzantine node cannot generate other node’s digital signature.
In LFT2, there exist two steps, propose and vote. In propose step, a leader
proposes a new block and broadcasts to other nodes. In vote step, each node
checks the received block and sends a vote message to other nodes. The basic
rule of LFT2 is as follows.
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Fig. 4: LFT2 algorithm. Block n will be a candidate block after voting for block
n, and it’s finally committed after voting for block n+ 1. Obviously, after Vote
Block n+ 1 phase, block n+ 1 will be a candidate block.
– ProposeTimer
• If propose step starts, ProposeTimer works.
• If ProposeTimeout occurs, a failure vote progresses.
– VoteTimer
• In vote step, if enough vote messages arrive but consensus isn’t com-
pleted, Votetimer works.
• If consensus completes within a fixed time, VoteTimer stops.
• If consensus doesn’t complete within a fixed time, VoteTimeout occurs.
– Propose
• A leader makes only one block in one round.
– Vote
• A validator receives a new block from the leader.
• Validators check the block information (if it’s proposed by a proper
leader, has the correct previous hash, and is connected with the can-
didate block, etc).
• If the block is valid, validators send a vote message to other nodes.
– Candidate
• If a node receives enough votes for a block of a higher round or a block
with a higher height than the candidate block that the node views, the
node changes this block to a candidate block.
– Commit
• A node commits the previous candidate block when replacing the current
candidate block with a new candidate block.
We define states and transitions for each node based on above rules in Sec-
tion 3.
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3 System Formalization
3.1 Definitions
In this section, we formalize the LFT2 protocol. This formalization would
help to understand the LFT2 consensus protocol and prove safety and liveness.
Before the formalization, we first define variables. For the network formalization,
M represents a message, which transmits from a node to other nodes, and N in-
dicates the number of nodes in the system. For the node formalization, we define
two variables: in and out. The parameter in indicates a message set including
valid new information, and out indicates a message set, which a node has to send
to other nodes. The parameter h indicates a block height, T and V are a set of
collected transactions and a set of votes for a candidate block, respectively. Our
model follows almost the paper [3].
3.2 The Multicast Channel Automaton
1 State
net ⊆M× 2N , initially {}
2 Transitions
SEND(m,X)
Eff: net := net ∪ {(m,X)}
RECEIVE(m)x
Pre: ∃(m,X) ∈ net : (x ∈ X
Eff: net := net− {(m,X)} ∪ {(m,X − x)})
MISBEHAVE(m,X,X ′)
Pre: (m,X) ∈ net
Eff: net := net− {(m,X)} ∪ {(m,X ′)})
In this section, we model a network state and transitions of a blockchain
system. The variable net represents a state of network, and 2N is a vector that
represents whether each node received or not received a message. SEND(m,X)
means sending message m to node set X, so state net should include (m,X)
after SEND(m,X). RECEIVE(m)x means that node x receives message m, so
we should update net state as follows. Because node x received the message
according to RECEIVE(m)x, we remove (m,X) from net and add (m,X−x) to
net. MISBEHAVE(m,X,X ′) is similar with a RECEIVE process. The difference
is because of misbehavior, the receiving node set will be X ′ instead of X.
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3 Auxiliary functions
proposer(h) → block height (input), proposer node ID (output)
check hash(B) → block info (input), boolean (output)
node candidate block(i) → node ID (input), the input node’s candidate block info
(output)
block candidate block(B) → block info (input), the input block’s candidate block
info (output)
block height(B) → block info (input), the input block’s height (output)
node height(i)→ node info (input), the input node’s candidate block height (output)
same vote(in) → the largest set of the same votes in in
3.3 The Replica Automaton
These auxiliary functions use for representing below transitions. Each func-
tion has own input and output values. For example, proposer(h) function has
block height h an an input and outputs the proposer node ID for h. This function
can use to check if the proposer (leader) is valid at block height h. The function
check hash(B) has block information B as an input and outputs boolean. This
function checks the correctness of hash value of block B and returns if the value
is true or false. Lastly, same vote(in) means a maximal set of same votes in in.
This is used for checking whether enough votes are collected.
3.4 The Replica Automaton
4 Input transitions
RECEIVE(〈NEW-BLOCK, B(h, T, V )〉σj )i
Pre: j = proposer(h) ∧ heighti = h− 1 ∧ check hash(B) ∧ statei = ready∧
node candidate block(i) = block candidate block(B)
Eff: ini := ini ∪ {〈NEW-BLOCK, B(h, T, V )〉}
statei = process
SEND({〈VOTE, V (N,B′, B)〉})
RECEIVE(〈VOTE, V (N,B′, B)〉σj )i
Pre: (〈NEW-BLOCK, B(h, T, V )〉 ∈ ini ∧ 〈VOTE, V (N,B′, B)〉σj /∈ ini) or
(block height(B) > node height(i)∧VOTE, V (N,B′, B)〉σj /∈ ini)
Eff: ini := ini ∪ {〈VOTE, V (N,B′, B)〉σj}
RECEIVE(〈TIMEOUT, BLANK)i
Pre: 〈NEW-BLOCK, B(h, T, V )〉 /∈ ini ∧ 〈TIMEOUT, BLANK〉σj /∈ ini
Eff: ini := ini ∪ {〈TIMEOUT, BLANK〉σj 〉}
The above transitions represent state transitions when there exist new in-
puts or outputs. Input transitions occur when a message is received from other
nodes, and output transitions occur when a message should be sent to other
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5 Output Transition
SEND(m)i
Pre: m ∈ outi
Eff: outi := outi − {m}
nodes. In Algorithms 4, 5, and 6, Pre indicates conditions required for the cor-
responding transition, and Eff indicates the result of the transitions. For ex-
ample, RECEIVE(〈NEW-BLOCK, B(h, T, V )〉σj )i means that node i receives
message 〈NEW-BLOCK, B(h, T, V )〉 from node j, and it should satisfy condi-
tions in Pre (see Algorithm 4). The result of the transition is represented in Eff.
RECEIVE(〈NEW-BLOCK, B(h, T, V )〉σj )i occurs when a NEW-BLOCK mes-
sage is arrived. RECEIVE(〈VOTE, V (N,B′, B)〉σj )i occurs when a VOTE mes-
sage is arrived, and RECEIVE(〈TIMEOUT, BLANK)i occurs when a TIME-
OUT message is arrived. As another example, we describe SEND(m)i repre-
sented in Algorithm 5. This means that node i sends message m to other nodes,
so m should be in outi. After SEND(m)i occurs, m should be removed from
outi.
6 Internal transitions
SEND BLOCK(h, T, V )i
Pre: proposer(h) = i ∧ node height(i) = h− 1 ∧ statei = ready
Eff: outi := outi ∪ {〈NEW-BLOCK, B(h, T, V )〉}
SEND({〈NEW-BLOCK, B(h, T, V )〉})
SEND TIMEOUTi
Pre: {〈NEW-BLOCK, B(h, T, V )〉} /∈ ini
Eff: outi := outi ∪ {〈TIMEOUT, BLANK〉}
SEND({〈TIMEOUT, BLANK〉})
COMMITi
Pre: |same vote(ini)| >= 2f + 1
Eff: for V (N,B′, B) ∈ same vote(ini),
commit(B′)
candidate(B)
node height(i) := block height(B′)
statei := ready
VOTE FAILi
Pre: 〈NEW-BLOCK, B(h, T, V )〉 ∈ ini ∧ |same vote(ini)| < 2f + 1
Eff: statei := ready
VOTE TIMEOUTi
Pre: 〈NEW-BLOCK, B(h, T, V )〉 /∈ in ∧ |same vote(ini)| >= 2f + 1
(for m ∈ same vote(ini), type(m) = TIMEOUT )
Eff: statei = ready
Algorithm 6 represents state transitions that occur internally in a node.
SEND BLOCK(h, T, V )i occurs when node i is a proposer so the node has to
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make a new block and send it to other nodes. SEND TIMEOUTi occurs when a
node has to receive NEW-BLOCK message but no NEW-BLOCK message ar-
rived until propose timeout occurs. COMMITi occurs when enough VOTE mes-
sages are received, where votes are for committing a new block. VOTE FAILi
occurs when vote timeout occurs, which means enough VOTE messages aren’t
received (i.e., the number of elements in same vote(in) does not satisfy 2f + 1).
In this case, consensus is failed. Lastly, VOTE TIMEOUTi occurs when enough
TIMEOUT messages arrive, which means the leader node doesn’t send a NEW-
BLOCK message.
3.5 Consensus Process
Next, we formalize the LFT2 consensus process by using transitions. First,
a leader should send a new block to other nodes. Other nodes wait for a new
block but if it doesn’t arrive until propose timeout occurs, then send TIMEOUT
message and vote about the message. On the other hand, a new block arrives
in time, then the node sends VOTE message to other nodes. In vote phase, if
vote timeout occurs, then VOTE TIMEOUT will execute. If vote failure oc-
curs, then VOTE FAIL will execute, and if both vote timeout and vote failure
don’t occur and enough votes for the new block message arrive, then COMMIT
will execute. In this case, the round successfully ends.
7 Consensus process
SEND BLOCK(h, T, V ) (Leader Only)
if propose timeout occurs then
SEND TIMEOUT
RECEIVE(〈TIMEOUT, BLANK)
VOTE TIMEOUT
else
RECEIVE(〈NEW-BLOCK, B(h, T, V )〉σj )
SEND(〈VOTE, V (N,B′, B)〉)
end if
if vote timeout occurs then
RECEIVE(〈TIMEOUT, BLANK)
VOTE TIMEOUT
else if vote failure occurs then
RECEIVE(〈TIMEOUT, BLANK)
VOTE FAIL
else
RECEIVE(〈VOTE, V (N,B′, B)〉σj )
COMMIT
end if
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4 Safety and Liveness
In this chapter, we first define safety and liveness and prove that LFT2
satisfies safety and liveness under certain conditions. In addition, to measure
liveness quality of LFT2, we suggest a metric, γ − function, which represents
an average rate of generating committed blocks.
4.1 Safety
Before proving that the LFT2 satisfies the safety property, we define safety
below.
Definition 1. (Safety) We state that a blockchain system satisfies safety when
a conflicting block never commits.
The intuitive meaning of satisfying a safety property is conflicting blocks will
never commit. In other words, safety asserts that nothing bad thing happens,
where bad things mean that conflicting blocks are committed. Conflicting blocks
include two types: The first type is a block including conflicting transactions
such as double-spending transactions or invalid transactions. The second type
indicates blocks when they are committed at the same height. In Lemmas 1 and
2, we prove that the second and first types of conflicting blocks will not commit
in LFT2, respectively.
Lemma 1. In LFT2, two different blocks cannot be committed at the same
height when at most f byzantine nodes exist in a system where there are 3f + 1
nodes.
Proof. Let’s assume two different blocks B1 and B2 committed at height h. This
means that there are at least 2f+1 nodes who committed block B1 and another
at least 2f + 1 nodes who committed block B2. Therefore, this means at least
4f + 2 votes provided by nodes exist. Because at most f nodes can vote two
times simultaneously, at most 4f + 1 votes can exist, which implies that two
different blocks cannot be committed at the same height.
Lemma 2. In LFT2, two conflict transactions cannot be committed when at
most f byzantine nodes exist in a system where there are 3f + 1 nodes.
Proof. By Lemma 1, in LFT, a fork (i.e., committing different blocks at the same
height) cannot be happen. Without a fork, to commit conflict transaction, there
should be at least 2f+1 malicious nodes. However, because at most f byzantine
nodes can exist, conflict transactions cannot be committed.
From both lemmas, we show that LFT2 satisfies the safety property.
Theorem 1. LFT2 satisfies a safety property.
Proof. In LFT2, there is no way to invalidate an already committed block. There-
fore, if there is no conflicting block committed, the safety property would satisfy.
By Lemmas 1 and 2, there is no conflicting block committed so LFT2 satisfies
the safety property.
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4.2 Liveness
Next, we analyze liveness of LFT2. We first define liveness below.
Definition 2. (Liveness) We state that a blockchain system satisfies liveness
when a new block is committed without stuck.
Intuitively, satisfying a liveness property is that a new block will be commit-
ted continuously without any stuck. In other words, liveness asserts that some-
thing a good thing eventually happens, where a good thing implies committing
a block.
Now, using some assumptions, we prove liveness of LFT2. Note that we
cannot prove liveness without any network assumptions according to FLP im-
possibility [5].
Theorem 2. We assumes that every non-byzantine node i is in statei = ready
at some specific time, where statei = ready implies that node i is ready to enter
a new round. We also define d as a time difference between when the first node
gets the next ready and when the last node gets the next ready. Then if both
d + ∆ < ProposeT imeout < ∞ and 2∆ < V oteT imeout < ∞ are satisfied,
consensus would complete. Furthermore, if the leader is a non-byzantine node, a
new block will be committed eventually.
Proof. Assume that both nodes A and B are non-byzantine, and nodes A and B
are the first and last nodes gotten state ready, respectively. That is, node A first
got stateA = ready, and node B lastly got stateB = ready. Let t be the time
when node A’s state became ready, i.e. the time when node B’s state became
ready would be t+d according to the definition of d. At time t, a proposer timer
of node A works until t+ ProposeT imeout. If node A didn’t receive the NEW-
BLOCK message until t + ProposeT imeout, then the node A will send TIME-
OUT message. To prove the theorem, let’s consider the worst case. The worst case
is when the new round leader is node B, which means that a new round leader
is the latest node whose state became ready. To complete consensus, NEW-
BLOCK message should arrive at node A until t + ProposeT imeout. However,
because we assumed that node B is the leader and the time when stateB = ready
is t+d, the maximum time when node A receives NEW-BLOCK will be t+d+∆.
As a result, to complete the consensus,
t+ d+∆ < t+ ProposeT imeout
should be met.
After sending a NEW-BLOCK message, if a vote timer of node B works until
t + d + V oteT imeout. If node B doesn’t receive enough VOTE messages until
t+d+V oteT imeout, then node B would think that consensus is failed and it’d go
to next step. Thus, to complete the consensus, enough VOTE messages should
arrive at node B until t+ d+ V oteT imeout. The worst case in this situation is
that the VOTE message sender receives NEW-BLOCK message at t+d+∆ and
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then sends the VOTE message but the VOTE message arrives at t+ d+∆+∆
to B. As a result, to complete the consensus,
t+ d+ 2∆ < t+ d+ V oteT imeout
should be satisfied.
Obviously, if there is no ProposeT imeout and a leader is malicious, then the
leader may not send a message, so replicas never get NEW-BLOCK message.
This means that consensus will be never completed. Similarly, if there is no
V oteT imout and a leader is malicious, then the leader can generate a conflicting
NEW-BLOCK message, so replicas never receive enough VOTE messages. This
also makes consensus never complete. Thus,
ProposeT imeout <∞
V oteT imeout <∞
should be satisfied. Finally, if the following equation
d+∆ < ProposeT imeout <∞
2∆ < V oteT imeout <∞
is satisfied, then the consensus is completed.
After the consensus is completed, we assume that a new block is not com-
mitted, which means that timeout occurs at some point. Also, we assume that
ProposeT imeout occurs. Since the number of byzantine nodes is less or equal
to f and d + ∆ < ProposeT imeout < ∞ is satisfied, the only case that
ProposeT imeout can occur is when the leader is byzantine, which is a con-
tradiction.
Next, let’s assume V oteT imeout occurs. Similarly, since the number of byzan-
tine nodes is less or equal to f and 2∆ < V oteT imeout < ∞ is satisfied, the
only case that V oteT imeout can occur is when the leader is malicious. The
V oteT imeout occurrence means that not enough VOTE messages arrive but no
more than f number of byzantine nodes exist. This means that conflicting NEW-
BLOCK messages are propagated to each node. The only node who can make
conflicting NEW-BLOCK messages is the leader. This is because if one of other
nodes makes conflicting NEW-BLOCK messages, the message would be filtered
by each node using proposer function. In conclusion, both timeout cases can
occur only when the leader is byzantine, but this is a contradiction. Therefore,
if the leader is a non-byzantine node, a new block would be committed.
Moreover, we define γ − function to measure how good LFT2 has liveness.
Definition 3. Let ν be the total number of faulty nodes in the LFT2 system, we
define γ − function (i.e., γ(ν)) as follows:
γ(ν) = lim
m→∞E[Xm,ν ], where Xm,ν =
committed block(m, ν)
m
The term of committed block(m, ν) indicates the number of committed blocks
during changing a leader m-times if the system has ν faulty nodes.
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Then we prove the minimum average rate of generating committed blocks is
γ(f) in LFT2.
Lemma 3. If ν ≤ f , d+∆ < ProposeT imeout <∞ and 2∆ < V oteT imeout <
∞ are satisfied at each round, then γ(ν) = n− ν
n
. Here, d indicates a time
difference between when the first node gets the next ready and when the last
node gets the next ready.
Proof. LFT2 uses a round-robin type of a leader selection algorithm. Therefore,
each node would be a leader once during changing a leader n times. By Theo-
rem 2, if a leader is a non-byzantine node, a new block would be committed by
consensus. Thus,
E[committed block(n, ν)] = n− ν
is satisfied. By the division theorem, we can represent m as follows:
m = nq + r, where 0 ≤ r < n
Using both results, we can represent E[committed block(m, ν)] as follows:
E[committed block(m, ν)] = E[committed block(nq + r, ν)]
⇒ q(n− ν) = E[committed block(nq, ν)]
≤ E[committed block(m, ν)]
≤ E[committed block(n(q + 1), ν)]
= (q + 1)(n− ν)
∴ q(n− ν) ≤ E[committed block(m, ν)] ≤ (q + 1)(n− ν)
Therefore, we can represent E[Xm,ν ] as below:
E[Xm,ν ] = E
[
committed block(nq + r, ν)
nq + r
]
∴ q(n− ν)
nq + r
≤ E[Xm,ν ] ≤ (q + 1)(n− ν)
nq + r
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Thus, γ(ν) as follow:
γ(ν) = lim
m→∞E[Xm,ν ]
= lim
q→∞
q(n− ν)
nq + r
= lim
q→∞
q(n− ν) + (n− ν)
nq + r
=
n− ν
n
This completes the proof.
Theorem 3. In LFT2, if d+∆ < ProposeT imeout <∞ and 2∆ < V oteT imeout <
∞ are satisfied at each round, then the following inequality is satisfied.
lim
m→∞E[Xm] ≥ γ(f), where Xm =
committed block(m)
m
Here, d indicates a time difference between when the first node gets the next ready
and when the last node gets the next ready. Parameter committed block(m)
represents the number of committed blocks during changing a leader m times
when the system has at most f faulty nodes.
Proof. Let mi be the number of rounds in which i faulty nodes exist during
changing a leader m times. Obviously, m =
f∑
i=0
mi. Here, note that when a
leader changes, one round passes. Then we can represent Xm as follow:
Xm = X
′
m,0 +X
′
m,1 + · · ·+X ′m,f−1 +X ′m,f
=
m0
m
Xm0,0 +
m1
m
Xm1,1 + · · ·+
mf−1
m
Xmf−1,f−1 +
mf
m
Xmf ,f ,
where X ′m,ν =
partially committed block(m, ν)
m
The term partially committed block(m, ν) means the number of committed
blocks when the system has ν faulty nodes during changing a leader m-times.
Using the linearity of expectation, the following equation is satisfied:
E[Xm] =
m0
m
E[Xm0,0] +
m1
m
E[Xm1,1] + · · ·+
mf−1
m
E[Xmf−1,f−1] +
mf
m
E[Xmf ,f ]
By Lemma 3,
γ(0) ≥ γ(1) ≥ · · · ≥ γ(f − 1) ≥ γ(f)
is satisfied. Therefore, the following inequality is hold:
lim
m→∞E[Xm] = limm→∞
(m0
m
γ(0) +
m1
m
γ(1) + · · ·+ mf−1
m
γ(f − 1) + mf
m
γ(f)
)
≥ lim
m→∞
(m0
m
+
m1
m
+ · · ·+ mf−1
m
+
mf
m
)
γ(f)
= γ(f)
This completes the proof.
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5 Comparative Analysis
In this section, we compare LFT2 with other two consensus protocols. From
this comparison, we study trade-offs among the three consensus algorithms.
5.1 PBFT vs LFT2 vs Chained Hotstuff
Scalability. LFT2 [7] is between PBFT [4] and Hotstuff [10] logically. When
broadcasting a vote message, LFT2 is similar to PBFT. On the other hand,
because it doesn’t commit a new block in one round, we can say that LFT2 is
similar to Chained Hotstuff. Without any byzantine nodes, the average number
of phases required for committing a block is one, two, and three for Chained Hot-
stuff, LFT2, and PBFT, respectively. All three consensus algorithms need three
steps during one block committing process, but the average number of phases
required to commit a block depends on how they apply pipelining technique. For
this reason, in terms of scalability, Chained Hotstuff has the best performance
while PBFT is the worst.
Network Bandwidth. PBFT has three phases in one round; a leader first
broadcasts a message to other nodes, the nodes vote the message received from
the leader in the second phase, and the nodes send the pre-commit message
based on the received votes in the last phase. Using big-O notation, the first,
second, and third phases would have the network bandwidth complexity of
O(N), O(N2), and O(N2), respectively. Here, N means the number of nodes
in the consensus system. LFT2 has two phases where a leader first broadcasts
a message to other nodes and then the nodes vote the message that the leader
sent in the second phase. Using big-O notation, the first and second phases have
the network bandwidth complexity of O(N) and O(N2), respectively. Chained
Hotstuff has only one phase where a leader first broadcasts a message to other
nodes and then, similar to a voting process, each node responses to the leader.
Using big-O notation, each phase would have the network bandwidth complex-
ity of O(N). Considering the above, we find out that Chained Hotstuff has the
best network bandwidth complexity, compared to PBFT and LFT2. In addition,
even though PBFT and LFT2 have the same network bandwidth complexity in
terms of Big-O notation, we can state that LFT2 has better network bandwidth
complexity than PBFT because LFT2 and PBFT have two phases and three
phases on average, respectively.
Decentralization. From the decentralization point of view, PBFT is the best
because only one of the three phases is involved with a leader. In PBFT, only
pre-prepare phase is a leader-dependent phase, but the other phases, prepare
and commit phases, are leader-independent phases. Therefore, a proportion of
leader-involved phases is 33.3%, where a proportion of leader-involved phases
indicates the ratio of the number of leader-involved phases to the number of
phases in one round. In Chained Hotstuff, however, every phase is involved with
a leader. Every phase of Chained Hotstuff is symmetric, and a leader collects the
vote messages, so a proportion of leader-involved phases is 100%. We can also
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consider that LFT2 is positioned between PBFT and Chained Hotstuff. In LFT2,
the propose phase is the leader-dependent phase but vote phase is the leader-
independent phase, which implies that a proportion of leader-involved phases
is 50%. Considering the above, we find out that PBFT has the best decentral-
ization, LFT2 is the second, and Chained Hotstuff is the worst decentralization
level.
Table 1: Comparison among the three consensus algorithms
PBFT LFT2 Chained Hotstuff
Scalability (Average number of phases
per a committed block)
Worst (3) Second (2) Best (1)
Network Bandwidth (Big-O notation) Worst (O(N2)) Second (O(N2)) Best (O(N))
Decentralization
(Proportion of leader-involved phases)
Best (33.3%) Second (50%) Worst (100%)
6 Simulation
In this chapter, we simulate the LFT2 consensus algorithm using LFT2 im-
plementation [6]. Our simulation measures γ−function by varying two timeouts:
ProposeT imeout and V oteT imeout. In our simulation, 1) we investigated the
relationship between timeout and γ−function by varying the number of nodes,
and 2) the relationship between timeout and γ − function by varying the num-
ber of failure nodes. We set ProposeT imeout and V oteT imeout to the same
value, as ICON LOOP [2] set them, and simulate the timeout range from 0 to 4
seconds in 0.1 second increments.
6.1 Methodology
The LFT2 implementation provides a simulation tool with a system console,
which can control the simulation environments. In the original implementation
code, the network delay was set to a random value between 0 and 1 second,
and the ProposeT imeout and V oteT imeout was set to 2 seconds. However,
in the real network, delay doesn’t follow the random function, so we had to
change the network delay model to a similar one to real. Because network delay
changes dynamically for various reasons, we choose to collect real data rather
than modeling network delay theoretically. We collected a data for network delay
in a website [1], which provides some network information about Bitcoin. We use
the ‘current block propagation delay distribution’ of 3 February, 2020. The delay
distribution represents the elapsed time between the first reception of an INV
message announcing a new block and the subsequent reception from other peers
in the Bitcoin network. The delay information contains some delay data that is
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over 4 seconds, but the most of data is less than 4 seconds. Thus, we ignore the
data which is over 4 seconds. The probability distribution of the Bitcoin network
delay is shown in Figure 5.
Fig. 5: Current block propagation delay distribution of the Bitcoin network on 3
February, 2020
Using the simulation tool provided by ICON LOOP [6], we can measure
γ − function under various settings. We do an experiment by changing two
variables: the number of nodes in the LFT2 network and the number of failure
nodes In both cases, we measure the value of γ−function with varying a timeout
from 0 to 4 seconds in 0.1 second increments. Specifically, in the first, we measure
γ − function under four different settings of the total number of nodes, 4, 10,
50, and 100. In the second case, we measure γ−function varying the number of
failed nodes when total number of noes in LFT2 is 21. We calculated γ−function
by running the LFT2 simulator until more than 200 blocks are created.
6.2 Result
The number of nodes. Values of γ − function with varying the number
of nodes is represented in Figure 6. In this figure, we can see that values of
γ − function are similar even when the number of nodes is different, which
implies that γ− function is rarely influenced by the number of nodes. Also, the
value of γ − function rises sharply between 0.2 and 0.6 seconds because most
of network delay is concentrated in 0.1 to 0.3 seconds (refer to Figure 5). This
supports that our timeout condition in the liveness proof is reasonable when we
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Fig. 6: γ-function with varying timeout and the number of nodes
set the value of timeout to 2 seconds. Finally, from Figure 6, we observe that
γ − function converges to 100% at timeout of greater than 2 seconds, which
means that without any failure node, LFT2 commits all blocks properly.
Failure. We also simulate LFT2 by varying the extent of failure, where the
number of all nodes is set to 21. Figure 7 represents the value of γ − function
when the number of failed nodes is from zero to six out of 21 and timeout is
from 0 to 4 seconds. As shown in the figure, one can see γ− function converges
to 1− failure as timeout increases, where failure indicates a fraction of failure
nodes to all nodes. This conforms with Lemma 3. When the value of failure is
less than or equal to 421 , γ − function converges within an error range of about
2% at timeout of 2.7 s. Meanwhile, when five and six nodes are failed, timeout
is required to be greater than 3.9 s and 5.3 s, respectively, for γ − function to
converge. Table 2 represents timeout when the value of γ − function reaches
to the value of convergence for the first time, under various settings of failure.
In Table 2, one can see that the greater the value of failure is, the greater the
timeout when γ−function reaches to the value of convergence for the first time.
Table 2: Comparison among the three consensus algorithms
Failure 0 2/21 3/21 4/21 5/21 6/21
Timeout (s) 2.2 2.3 2.6 2.8 3.7 4.9
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Fig. 7: γ-function with varying timeout and the number of failure nodes
7 Conclusion
Many blockchain consensus algorithms have been developed, and one of most
important properties of the consensus algorithm is safety and liveness. In this
paper, we analyze LFT2 used in ICON. To do this, we formalize the protocol and
analyze safety and liveness of LFT2. It requires a certain network assumption to
prove liveness. Therefore, to decide if this assumption is reasonable, we simulate
LFT2 and measure liveness quality by using our metric, γ−function. This shows
that when we set timeout to a sufficiently large value (about 4 seconds), a high
level of liveness can be guaranteed.
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